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On the implications of the practice – institution distinction: 
MacIntyre and the application of modern virtue ethics to business
1
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It would appear that those engaged in philosophical discussion in business ethics have 
given up on the attempt to make use of MacIntyre‟s approach to ethics (what I shall call 
„modern virtue ethics‟) and have instead decided that debate about organisational ethics 
in general and business ethics in particular should be conducted using the language of 
stakeholding
2
. This is, in my view, a premature abandonment. In this paper, I wish to 
argue that the implications of the practice – institution distinction which MacIntyre 
makes have not been fully explored, and, by such exploration, to force the realisation that 
there is much more fruitful work still to be done here. 
 
 
The abandonment of modern virtue ethics 
 
MacIntyre is, in a sense, his own worst enemy. He has been characterised as anti-
modernity, anti-business (Dobson, 1997, p.128) and anti-managerial. He states, for 
example, that “much modern industrial productive and service work is organised so as to 
exclude the features distinctive of a practice” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.286), leading Wicks to 
conclude that “MacIntyre‟s views would effectively rule out any conception of business 
that is remotely similar to capitalism as we know it. [MacIntyre‟s larger thesis] would 
appear to require transformation of the economic realm … towards something 
fundamentally different than what we would call “business”” (Wicks, 1997, p.133). At 
the macro level, then, this would seem to imply that MacIntyre‟s thesis would require 
such fundamental changes that it is simply not worth our while even setting out on the 
journey. 
 
At the micro level of the individual corporation, there is the question as to whether 
expecting firms to operate in what might be called a virtuous way, is simply asking for 
them to put themselves out of business. Thus, MacIntyre‟s comment that, “We should 
therefore expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external goods were to 
become dominant, the concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition and then perhaps 
something near total effacement” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.196) leads Dobson to conclude that 
the „virtuous firm‟, if placed in a competitive market environment “would rapidly perish” 
(Dobson, 1996, p.227 and see Dobson, 1997, p.130). 
 
Dobson‟s suggestion – that if all stakeholders were virtuous, such that the corporate 
community were a real polis, a virtuous firm might flourish – in effect puts the micro 
level problem firmly back in the macro level arena and leaves Dobson questioning 
whether the virtuous firm is a feasible and desirable alternative type of business 
organisation, or no more than a philosopher‟s pipe-dream (Dobson, 1996, p.231).  
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And at this point the argument in effect dies with no satisfactory conclusion – or, by 
implication, the conclusion that it is all a philosopher‟s pipe-dream and therefore not 
worth pursuing. 
 
 
The practice – institution distinction explored 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre‟s arguments for and developments of virtue ethics, and their 
application to the area of business are already well documented (see Moore, 1997; 
Collier, 1995, 1998, for example). In order to re-open the debate, however, attention 
needs to be drawn to two particular aspects of his contribution to virtue ethics. Much of 
this will already be familiar, but it is necessary to lay out the ground before drawing out 
the  implications. 
 
The first aspect is the notion of a practice. MacIntyre‟s much-quoted definition of a 
practice is as follows: 
 
"Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate 
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended." (MacIntyre, 1985, p.187) 
 
The particular type of internal good of concern here is the “excellence of the products” 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.189). To illustrate this, let us take two familiar situations. Suppose I 
deliver a course of lectures (the product) through which, not only are my students edified 
(one lives in hope), but I myself, through “trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity” attain the 
internal goods of the intellectual stimulation of putting together and delivering a course 
of lectures, and the satisfaction of enabling others to learn. I do this in the context of the 
practice of teaching and learning. 
 
Alternatively, take a situation in which a marketing manager designs and executes a 
marketing plan through which, not only does the corporation benefit, but the individual 
derives intellectual stimulation, the enjoyment of the exercise of practical skills and the 
stimulation that the competitive situation affords. As will be argued later, she does so in 
the context of the practice of business. 
 
These internal goods derived from practices can be contrasted with external goods such 
as fame, power, profit or, more generally, success. When achieved, MacIntyre argues, 
these external goods are always some individual's property and possession. They are 
characteristically objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as winners. 
With internal goods, however, although there is competition in one sense, this is 
competition to excel and so benefits all members of the community engaged in the 
practice. 
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This brings us to the second aspect of MacIntyre‟s work. An important distinction is 
drawn by MacIntyre between practices and institutions.  
 
"Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external 
goods. They are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are 
structured in terms of power and status, and they distribute money, power and 
status as rewards. Nor could they do otherwise if they are to sustain not only 
themselves, but also the practices of which they are the bearers. For no practices 
can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed so intimate 
is the relationship of practices to institutions - and consequently of the goods 
external to the goods internal to the practices in question - that institutions and 
practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the 
creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the 
institution, in which the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is 
always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution. In this context the 
essential feature of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage 
and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions." 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.194) 
 
It is possible to depict MacIntyre‟s schema as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MacIntyre uses the example of chess as a practice to illustrate the nature of practices and 
of the exercise of virtue within them and the internal goods that might thus be derived 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.188). To play chess seriously, however, requires a chess club – an 
institution which „houses‟ the practice of chess. The club must have a committee and 
rules, it must decide who can be a member and what membership fees to charge. It will 
PRACTICE 
 
Concerned with the 
exercise of virtue 
and the 
achievement of 
internal goods 
INSTITUTION 
 
Concerned with the achievement 
of external goods 
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enter teams in leagues and decide who is to play in which team. It will achieve a 
reputation (good or bad) and will be more or less successful on a number of counts – the 
„level‟ at which chess is played, the trophies its teams win, the club‟s financial viability 
and so on. It will, in other words be “involved in acquiring money and other material 
goods; [be] … structured in terms of power and status, and [will] distribute money, power 
and status as rewards”. 
 
In normal circumstances the distinction between the practice and the institution will be 
relatively opaque – they form “a single causal order”. However, there may be occasions 
in which “the ideals and the creativity of the practice are … vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for common goods of the 
practice is … vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution”. The club may, for 
example, decide to raise the membership fee and seek to attract a „better‟ class of member 
in order to move up several leagues and raise its external credibility. This may well be to 
the detriment of the „ordinary‟ players who wish to pursue their enjoyment and the 
perfection of their abilities in so far as they are able. 
 
MacIntyre‟s generalised description of institutions and their relationship with practices 
can be applied in almost any context. MacIntyre himself indicates that, “the range of 
practices is wide: arts, sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and 
sustaining of family life, all fall under the concept” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.188). So, for 
example, Universities, as indicated above, house the practices of teaching and learning, 
and research and here the single causal order formed by the practice and the institution is 
apparent. (It is also apparent to many UK academics that the practices are continuously 
vulnerable to the acquisitiveness and competitiveness of the institution (and Government 
in its various guises), and that therefore the need for the virtues (which enable the 
practices to resist the corrupting power of the institution) is, in this situation, also only 
too apparent. We will need to return to this point below in the discussion of business as a 
practice.) 
 
 
The application of MacIntyre‟s schema to business 
 
It does seem, therefore, that MacIntyre‟s schema can be applied directly to business as a 
practice and to corporations as institutions. However, it is necessary to substantiate this 
claim and to do so in a number of ways. First, it is necessary to reinforce the notion of 
business-as-practice. Second, and by implication, it is necessary to demonstrate that other 
parts of business - the functions of business such as marketing, production, human 
resource management or finance - are not, in themselves, practices. Third, it is also 
necessary to argue that other features of corporations - management and the employment 
relationship - are also not practices. Once these points are established, we can then move 
on to consider the implications of the business-as-practice schema. 
 
MacIntyre acknowledges that in After Virtue he did not pay particular attention to 
productive practices. He later makes good that lack of attention by referring specifically 
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to productive crafts such as “farming and fishing, architecture and construction …”. 
MacIntyre continues,  
 
“The aim internal to such productive crafts, when they are in good order, is never 
only to catch fish, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. It is to do so in a 
manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that there is not only a 
good product, but the craftsperson is perfected through and in her or his activity” 
(MacIntyre, 1994, p.284).  
 
It is clear from this description, and from the subsequent discussion of the type of fishing 
crew that would meet such criteria – a crew whose members have acquired “an 
understanding of and devotion to the excellences of fishing and to excellence in playing 
one‟s part as a member of such a crew” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285) – that MacIntyre‟s 
description of a productive craft can be extended to all such productive activities. It 
follows from this that business, as a productive activity, may be redescribed as a practice. 
The particular business may be fishing, or producing beef or milk, or building houses, or 
it may be providing financial services or mining or retailing. In each case the particular 
“excellences” may differ. What it means to be an excellent builder will clearly differ in 
some respects from what it means to be an excellent retailer, although there will be 
common features such as an emphasis on quality and high levels of customer service. The 
entirely common feature, however, is that each and every business falls within 
MacIntyre‟s definition of a practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity”. 
 
The fact that MacIntyre is suspicious of modern economic orders because of their focus 
on external goods will concern us later, but it by no means destroys the point that 
business can be regarded as a practice. Instead, it merely points to the fact that the tension 
between the institution which houses the practice (the corporation) and the practice itself 
(the business of fishing, retailing, building or whatever) will require particular attention. 
 
To reinforce the concept of business-as-practice let us turn to the second issue, namely 
whether parts of business, such as marketing or production, can be regarded as practices. 
It is clear from what MacIntyre says, that it is not just the catching of fish with which he 
is concerned (see, for example, his earlier discussion, where architecture is given as an 
example of a practice and bricklaying is not (MacIntyre, 1985, p.187)), but it is the whole 
range of activities which make up the practice of fishing including the purchase and 
maintenance of boats and equipment, the preparation of the fish for sale, and the actual 
sale itself. Not only this, but in his discussion of the ideal fishing crew it is clear that such 
a crew would not only have a concern for the others of its members, but that such concern 
would also extend to their immediate families and, potentially, to the whole society of a 
fishing village (MacIntyre, 1994, p.285). This, of course, stems from MacIntyre‟s 
concern to emphasise the communitarian nature of virtue ethics, but it may be extended 
here to emphasise that it is the whole range of activities and their associated implications 
with which MacIntyre is concerned. This reinforces the point that it is not possible to 
speak in terms of the practice of marketing or production; the practice of business must 
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be conceived of holistically, not as an aggregation of separate parts, and it is business-as-
practice with which we must concern ourselves. 
 
Let us illustrate this by applying it to retailing. Retailing involves all the usual functions 
of business – the purchasing of stock, employment of staff, purchase or rental of 
premises, out-of-store advertising, the display and sale of goods, computer systems to 
track stock, record sales and feed in to the accounts, accounting
3
, financial control and so 
on. Retailing involves the integration of all of these elements into a holistic activity. And 
it is only when we consider the holistic activity that it accords fully with MacIntyre‟s 
definition of a practice as a “coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity”. 
 
Finally, then, let us turn to the other features of business - management and the 
employment relationship – and to the argument that they are also not practices in 
themselves. It has been argued (Beadle, 1998) that employment is a practice or, at least, 
that employment can be a setting for practices and hence for the exercise of the virtues. 
However, in correspondence between Beadle and MacIntyre
4
, MacIntyre is unequivocal 
on this point: “ … my use of „practice‟ and my use of „institution‟ are such that 
employment can only be a feature of institutions, since institutions determine and enforce 
the division of labour and employment policies and activities are part of this 
determination and enforcement”, and again, “„Employment‟ is not for me the name either 
of a type of practice or a type of institution or organisation, but rather one feature of the 
lives of certain types of institution or organisation”.  
 
The clarification that employment is a feature of institutions reinforces the earlier point 
that it is business which is the practice. It also clarifies the nature of management, since 
here similarly it is clear that management is a feature of an institution but not a practice in 
and of itself. This contradicts Brewer‟s claim that “management can be construed as a 
practice under MacIntyre‟s definition” (Brewer, 1997, p.829), although it is apparent that 
Brewer herself inadvertently admits to this contradiction when she writes that she has 
argued that “the business sphere is a complex, cooperative social activity, thus one in 
which activities can constitute MacIntyre‟s view of practice” (Brewer, 1997, p.829).  
 
 
Implications of business-as-practice 
 
As indicated above, we will need to consider in greater depth the inter-relationship 
between the practice of business and the corporation in which the business is embedded. 
However, before turning to that, it is worth giving consideration to three direct 
consequences of the practice – institution distinction. 
 
First, MacIntyre‟s schema would seem to fit with and help to explain what many 
individuals experience in working within corporations. In many cases a tension exists 
between what individuals feel they ought to do when at work and what the corporation 
expects of them – a kind of ethical schizophrenia5. In MacIntyre‟s terms, they engage 
with the practice of business “through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
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realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity”. However, since the 
practice of business is often valued for its external goods, they find themselves “... 
dealing with a type of activity at once alien and antagonistic to practices”. It is clear, as 
we shall discuss later, that much modern industrial productive and service work is 
organised so as to exclude the features distinctive of a practice (MacIntyre, 1994, p.286), 
and this leads to the tension that the individuals experience. To redescribe this experience 
in stakeholder terminology, we could say that individuals find the service of shareholder 
value in tension with their personal values, which would often support a greater degree of 
priority being accorded to fellow employees, suppliers or customers, for example. In 
MacIntyre‟s terminology, the dominance of the pursuit of external goods threatens to 
eclipse the exercise of the virtues within the practice. 
 
A second consequence of the practice – institution distinction is that it helps to explain 
the claims that are made in respect of the market as a source of the virtues. Maitland, for 
example, has argued that the market produces both public virtues and private benefits. He 
notes two opposing views with respect to the market. One view, (the “pessimists”), sees 
commerce as hostile to the virtues: “the more completely a society has come to be 
dominated by market relations the weaker will be its capacity to foster the virtues” such 
that it will be “necessary to carve out sanctuaries from the market – such as family, 
school, church, community – where the virtues can be nurtured” (Maitland, 1997, p.18). 
“On this view the market is living on borrowed time – and on borrowed virtues” 
(Maitland, 1997, p. 20). The alternative approach, (the “optimists”), views the market as 
capable of generating or replenishing the stock of virtues necessary for the functioning of 
the market. This is partly because the market rewards the exercise of the virtues. 
 
Thus, Maitland endeavours to show that virtues such as trustworthiness, self-control, 
sympathy and fairness, that are necessary lubricants of the market, are in fact rewarded 
by the market because they protect a corporation‟s reputation or create business 
opportunities. “On this account, the virtues are not (just) public goods – that is, 
unrequited gifts to society – but are a source of private advantage in the marketplace” 
(Maitland, 1997, p.23). As such, the market fosters the virtues and, hence, he argues, the 
optimists are correct. 
 
MacIntyre‟s schema provides a different explanation for the same phenomenon. 
Business, as with any practice, rewards those who possess and exercise the virtues with 
the internal goods that are available. Thus, business is also a potential source of moral 
development in which “the craftsperson is perfected through and in her or his activity". 
Warren, also coming from a MacIntyrian perspective, argues similarly that a corporation, 
(because it houses the practice of business), should be regarded as “a morally significant 
institution in addition to being an instrumental organisation designed to fulfil an 
economic function” (Warren, 1996, p.87). This explanation, then, grounds the exercise, 
development and rewards for the virtues firmly in the practice of business. In doing so it 
not only relocates Maitland‟s argument but does so in a way that makes concrete what is 
otherwise very abstract. It is not “the market” (whatever that may be6) which is capable 
of generating or replenishing the stock of virtues, but the practice of business housed, as 
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it is, within corporations. It need not, be, therefore, that “all is seared with trade; bleared, 
smeared with toil”7; we can surely take a more positive view of business activity than that 
in so far as we concentrate on business-as-practice, with its potential for moral 
development through the possession and exercise of the virtues. 
 
A third consequence of the practice – institution distinction follows from the second and 
is well illustrated from Sennett‟s (1998) work. The title of his book, “The corrosion of 
character. The personal consequences of work in the new capitalism”, indicates that 
Sennett takes the opposite view of the free market to Maitland. Sennett bemoans the 
impact of capitalism on the development of individual character, claiming in effect that it 
is in the very nature of the capitalist system to undermine the possession and exercise of 
the virtues. Thus, in relation to one of the principles of capitalism - “no long term”- he 
notes that, “No long term is a principle which corrodes trust, loyalty and mutual 
commitment” (Sennett, 1998, p.24). Similarly, “The conditions of time in the new 
capitalism have created a conflict between character and experience, the experience of 
disjointed time threatening the ability of people to form their characters into sustained 
narratives” (Sennett, 1998, p.31). It is not clear that Sennett is aware of MacIntyre‟s work 
(in particular, MacIntryre‟s concept of a narrative quest), but the close accord of the 
terminology is striking.  
 
Sennett concludes: 
 
 “One of the unintended consequences of modern capitalism is that it has 
strengthened the value of place, aroused a longing for community. All the 
emotional conditions we have explored in the workplace animate that desire: the 
uncertainties of flexibility; the absence of deeply rooted trust and commitment; 
the superficiality of teamwork; most of all, the spectre of failing to make 
something of oneself in the world, to “get a life” through one’s work. All these 
conditions impel people to look for some other scene of attachment and depth.” 
(Sennett, 1998, p.138) 
 
Sennett‟s work obviously touches a raw nerve, but as with Maitland, MacIntyre‟s schema 
sheds light on what is actually at the root of Sennett‟s concerns, and is suggestive of a 
way forward. Sennett does not recognise the practice – institution distinction, and so fails 
to distinguish between the practice (which has the potential to be a place in which the 
virtues can be exercised, internal goods obtained, contributing to the achievement of the 
individual‟s telos within the context of his/her own narrative quest), and the corporation 
which houses the practice and has its focus on external goods. Consequently, “business” 
and “capitalism” are castigated together, whereas their separation is essential, and it is the 
corporation and the wider capitalist system which should form the focus of Sennett‟s 
critique. 
 
 
A creative tension? 
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We must, therefore, turn our full attention to MacIntyre‟s distinction and explore the 
inter-relationship between the practice of business and the corporation in which the 
business is embedded. 
 
At first sight this would seem to be problematic. As noted above, MacIntyre is suspicious 
of institutions which are valued for their external products since, “When they are so 
valued, we are always dealing with a type of activity at once alien and antagonistic to 
practices and very much at home in modern economic orders. And much modern 
industrial productive and service work is organized so as to exclude the features 
distinctive of a practice" (MacIntyre, 1994, p.286). 
 
Similarly, MacIntyre‟s earlier comment (quoted above) that, “We should therefore expect 
that, if in a particular society the pursuit of external goods were to become dominant, the 
concept of the virtues might suffer first attrition and then perhaps something near total 
effacement …” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.196), also suggests that MacIntyre shares very 
similar views to Sennett on the results of a capitalist system. Even MacIntyre‟s 
generalised description of institutions and their relationships with practices could have 
been written with business specifically in mind, since here the vulnerability of the 
practice (of business) to the institution (the corporation) seems to be especially clear. 
Indeed, MacIntyre notes that, “Practices are often distorted by their modes of 
institutionalisation, when irrelevant considerations relating to money, power and status 
are allowed to invade the practice” (MacIntyre, 1994, p.289). 
 
However, we need to note three countervailing aspects in order to achieve a more 
balanced view. First, in returning to MacIntyre‟s original definition of the practice – 
institution distinction we should note the intimate relationship of the two. No practice can 
survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions; they characteristically form a 
single causal order; there is a consequent intimate relationship between internal and 
external goods. 
 
Second, we should note that external goods are not objects of disdain. “I need to 
emphasize at this point that external goods genuinely are goods. Not only are they 
characteristic objects of human desire, whose allocation is what gives point to the virtues 
of justice and of generosity, but no one can despise them altogether without a certain 
hypocrisy.” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.196). Similarly, in a later work, MacIntyre returns to the 
inter-relationship of internal and external goods. It is worth quoting him at length: 
 
 “It would be a large misconception to suppose that allegiance to goods of the one 
kind necessarily excluded allegiance to goods of the other. For on the one hand 
those forms of activity within which alone it is possible to achieve the goods of 
excellence [internal goods], can only be sustained by being provided within 
institutionalised settings. And the maintenance of the relevant institutional and 
organisational forms always requires the acquisition and retention of some 
degree of power and some degree of wealth. Thus the goods of excellence cannot 
be systematically cultivated unless at least some of the goods of effectiveness 
[external goods] are also pursued. On the other hand it is difficult in most social 
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contexts to pursue the goods of effectiveness without cultivating at least to some 
degree the goods of excellence, and this for at least two reasons. The achievement 
of power, wealth and fame often enough requires as a means the achievement of 
some kind of genuine excellence. And moreover, since the goods of effectiveness 
are those goods which enable their possessor to be, within the limits of contingent 
possibility, what he or she wants, whenever what someone whose fundamental 
allegiance to effectiveness just happens to want, for whatever reason, is to be 
genuinely excellent in some way, goods of effectiveness will be put to the service 
of goods of excellence.” (MacIntyre, 1988, p.35) 
 
 
Third, we should also note MacIntyre‟s point that even if institutions do have corrupting 
power, “the making and sustaining of forms of human community - and therefore of 
institutions - itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a practice 
which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the virtues …” 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p.194, my emphasis). 
 
What follows from this discussion are two important points. The first is that MacIntyre is 
rightly concerned that when the focus of an organisation‟s activity becomes so firmly 
fixed on external goods to the detriment of the practice and the associated internal goods, 
the resultant institution (and generalised institutional forms that emerge), can be 
destructive of community and of individuals within the institution. This is, in effect, 
Sennett‟s contention about the nature of capitalism. 
 
But secondly, MacIntyre‟s schema, when worked through, indicates that the tension he 
initially observes - that the practice is always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness and 
competitiveness of the institution – may not be as destructive as he suggests. A full 
reading of MacIntyre potentially hints at a dynamic and creative tension rather than a 
static and destructive one. 
 
 
The virtuous corporation 
 
If this is so, what are the implications of this way of thinking about business 
organisations and this way of construing business ethics? 
 
The first implication is both obvious and important. This is that the corporation must 
continually be aware that it is founded on and has as its most important function, the 
sustenance of the practice. This is simply because, without the practice, the institution 
dies. Thus a retailing organisation which is so focused on external goods, such as profit 
and shareholder value, that it fails to nurture the practice it sustains - the specific business 
practice of retailing – will eventually find itself without the skills and resources it 
requires to sustain the practice. It will, in effect, kill itself from the inside.  
 
But interestingly, the initial responsibility for ensuring that the corporation remains 
focused on the practice lies with the practice itself. As MacIntyre points out, the essential 
 11 
feature of the virtues is clear: “without them, without justice, courage and truthfulness, 
practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions" (MacIntyre, 1985, p.194). 
So within those who engage directly in the practice there needs to be the commitment to 
exercise the virtues not only in pursuit of the internal goods of the practice which benefits 
them as individuals directly, but also against the corporation when it becomes, as it 
inevitably will at various times, too focused on external goods. MacIntyre has already 
made this clear: 
 
 “For the ability of a practice to retain its integrity will depend on the way in 
which the virtues can be and are exercised in sustaining the institutional forms 
which are the social bearers of the practice. The integrity of a practice causally 
requires the exercise of the virtues by at least some of the individuals who embody 
it in their activities; and conversely the corruption of institutions is always in part 
at least an effect of the vices.” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.195) 
 
The role of the corporation to focus on external goods provides the basis for the second 
implication of this way of thinking about business organisations and this way of 
construing business ethics. For it is clear that a focus on external goods is both a 
necessary and worthwhile function of the corporation. There may, for example, be times 
when the practice becomes so introverted and self-satisfied that it no longer sets out to 
achieve “those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity”. This will in large part be due to a failure of individuals engaged 
in the practice either to possess or to exercise the virtues. 
 
Again, however, it is difficult for those engaged in the practice to observe this or, even if 
they do observe it, to do anything about it. An important role of those who represent the 
corporation, therefore, is to act when they observe excellence not being pursued and to 
remind those engaged in the practice of their responsibility. This may well be more 
observable by those who represent the corporation for they will see, in the performance 
indicators used to measure the achievement of external goods, the failure of the practice 
to meet “best practice” elsewhere. 
 
All of this, however, is predicated on the corporation conceiving itself as an institution 
which houses a practice. However, if MacIntyre is right when he says that, “the making 
and sustaining of forms of human community - and therefore of institutions - itself has all 
the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a practice which stands in a peculiarly 
close relationship to the exercise of the virtues …” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.194, my 
emphasis), then we have an exciting possibility. It is not just that those who engage 
directly in the practice of business have the opportunity to exercise the virtues (and 
thereby to obtain internal goods, thus contributing to the achievement of the individual‟s 
telos within the context of his/her own narrative quest), but those who have, in one sense, 
outgrown the practice and now represent the corporation which houses it, also have the 
same opportunity in the making and sustaining of the institution. The exercise of the 
virtues is appropriate at this level also
8
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Assuming, therefore, that it is reasonable to talk of corporations as moral agents in and of 
themselves (see Moore (1999)), it seems to be appropriate to talk in terms of those who 
represent the corporation as having a responsibility to focus on the development of what 
we might appropriately call, corporate character. This is more than is implied in the 
terminology of corporate culture, for with it comes the connotation that there is an 
inherently moral perspective to be considered.  
 
The virtuous corporation will be one which has a corporate character that acknowledges 
that it houses a practice, that encourages the pursuit of excellence in the practice, aware 
that this is an entirely moral pursuit, and one which pursues the external goods in so far 
as they are necessary to and support the development of the practice. But it will not be so 
focused on the external goods that it fails to support the practice on which it itself is 
founded. The corporation will, however, through the incorporation of the virtues of those 
who represent it, and of the virtues of influential people in its recent past, be in a position 
to resist the corrupting power of the organisations with which it, in turn, relates - 
organisations like competitors, suppliers or those which represent the financial market. 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
I have suggested that MacIntyre is, in effect, too pessimistic in his criticism of business 
organisations and that it is precisely in the inter-play between the practice of business and 
the corporation in which it is embedded, in the inter-play between internal and external 
goods, that exciting possibilities exist for business and for business ethics. 
 
Is this all simply a “philosopher‟s pipe-dream”? Would the virtuous corporation as 
described here “rapidly perish”? I want to suggest that a fully worked out application of 
MacIntyre‟s modern virtue ethics means that, on the contrary, such firms would flourish. 
They would do so because the concentration on excellence in the practice and not on 
external goods per se, would, in many cases, actually improve their performance across a 
range of parameters rather than diminish it
9
. Remembering that one of the cardinal virtues 
is phronesis or practical wisdom, reminds us that there is a certain astuteness expected of 
the virtuous. 
 
Inevitably, such a concentration on excellence in the practice and the development of 
virtuous corporations would have an impact on the capitalist business world as we know 
it. It would be precisely in the application of the virtues, such as justice, within business-
as-practice, and in the development of virtuous corporations which, quite literally, 
incorporate justice, that some sort of progress towards the kind of society MacIntyre 
envisages would be achieved. This may, within the market sphere, allow only for justice 
according to which “what each receives is proportionate to what each contributes” 
(MacIntyre, 1999, pp.129-130), leaving MacIntyre‟s revised Marxist formula “from each 
according to her or his ability to each, so far as is possible, according to her or his needs” 
(MacIntyre, 1999, p.130), to be addressed by wider society. But if at least this were to be 
the case, it would be a considerable step forward. 
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But then, how does all this become a practical reality? I have a feeling that, like the 
gentleman who discovered at the age of eighty that he had been talking prose all his life, 
the main task lies in turning these concepts into a common-place language. We need to 
go back a century and more and talk the language of virtues and not of values (see 
Himmelfarb, 1995, pp.3-18 for example). And we need to explain and explore the 
concepts of practices and institutions, of internal and external goods, of telos and 
narrative, until modern virtue ethics becomes common parlance and not the domain of the 
few. 
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Notes 
 
1. The author would like to acknowledge the comments of Ron Beadle and Professor 
Deon Rossouw, together with two anonymous reviewers, on earlier versions of this 
paper. 
2. The debate in Business Ethics Quarterly ended in 1997 with Dobson‟s, Wicks‟ and 
Brewer‟s contributions. 
3. The position of accounting as a function of business is straightforward. The position 
of accounting as a profession, or the interaction of professions with either business-
as-practice or with corporations as institutions is beyond the scope of this paper. It is 
of interest to note, however, that Shaw (1995) suggests that professions provide a 
mediating influence between the corrupting power of the corporation and the 
common good of the practice. 
4. The correspondence consists of a series of e-mails spanning from November 1999 to 
June 2000 and is quoted with Beadle‟s agreement. The status of correspondence such 
as this should be taken into account; it does not necessarily equate to published work. 
5. I have noted this elsewhere. See Moore (1993). 
6. Jenkins, for example, reinforces this point: “ „The Market‟ does not „work‟, it is 
people who work. „The Market‟ is a metaphor and the „Free Market‟ an illusion” 
(Jenkins, 2000, p.239). 
7. Gerard Manley Hopkins‟ (1953, p.27) phrase from his poem „God‟s Grandeur‟. This 
is not a theme that Hopkins is well known for; little is said in his other poems. 
8. Beadle (1998) also makes this point. 
9. This would not necessarily mean improved financial performance, but it would 
certainly mean sufficiently good financial performance to ensure survival over the 
long run. The evidence to date in the area of social and ethical performance versus 
financial performance, however, which may be taken as at least a surrogate for a 
focus on the excellences of the practice, is suggestive of a positive relationship. See 
Griffin and Mahon (1997) for a summary. 
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